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The Value of Business Networks in Emerging Economies:   
An Analysis of Firms’ External Financing Opportunities  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Problems of contract enforcement are common in countries with weak institutions 
because there is no guarantee that contractual obligations will be upheld by the local 
institutions. Networks and informal relationships may thus emerge to facilitate 
functioning of many organisations in transition and emerging economies with weak legal 
and judicial institutions (e.g., Kandori, 1992; Boisot and Child, 1996; Guiso et al. 2004; 
Grief 2006; Ayyagari et al. 2008). In this context the present paper examines the role of 
firms’ affiliation to business networks on external corporate financing opportunities. 
Recent empirical studies in the organizational behaviour literature (e.g., Boisot and 
Child, 1996) suggest that informal networks are often a response to inadequate 
institutional support. In particular, lack of legal/judicial structure that guarantees written 
contracts and private property may render credit enforcement difficult. One can argue that 
a firm’s membership of a business network or association may help minimising the 
underlying costs of lending arising from the uncertainty of credit enforcement (see further 
discussion in section 3). The latter may be particularly important for subsidiaries of 
foreign banks operating in emerging economies where the problem of contract 
enforcement is worse.  
Our analysis focuses on a group of central and eastern European (CEE) countries, 
who are an important case in point. Even after a decade of reform, there is a growing 
feeling that the reforms have failed to spur adequately the development of banking in the 
CEE countries. Despite widespread reforms, use of external finance remains rather 
limited (only 20% of our sample firms had access to some bank finance), even by the 
standard of other developing and emerging economies. Further, among those firms with 
outstanding bank loans, many tend to have very high, potentially excessive, leverage (see 
Coricelli et al. 2011). This necessitates a further investigation of firms’ external financing 
opportunities in the region. In this respect, the present paper highlights the role of firms’ 
affiliations to business networks.   2
The analysis is developed in two steps. First, we examine the effect of business 
networking on firms’ financing choices (i.e., internal finance, bank finance, non-bank 
finance, and/or equity finance). Second, we focus on firms’ access to bank finance and, in 
this respect, examine the role of networking on firm’s access to loans from state, private 
domestic and foreign banks. The latter also allows us to explore evidence of firm-bank 
ownership matching, if any. Note however that a firm’s affiliation to a business network 
is unlikely to be exogenous as networked firms are unlikely to be a random sample of all 
sample firms. Hence one needs to correct for the underlying endogeneity bias arising out 
of this selection issue. We adopt two possible approaches: first, we obtain the predicted 
value of business association membership using a first stage regression (with some 
identifying restrictions; see further discussion in section 3.4) and use this as a potentially 
exogenous instrument for firm’s access to any external financing as well as access to 
bank loans (by bank ownership). Second, BEEPS data has a small panel element where a 
small fraction of sample firms were interviewed in both 2002 and 2005 (see further 
discussion in section 3). This allows us to use 2002 and 2005 BEEPS panel data
1 to 
obtain OLS fixed effects estimates. In other words, we use variation in access to external 
finance over time (2002-2005) for a given firm to identify the role of networking on firm 
financing opportunities.  
There is evidence from our analysis that, ceteris paribus, business networking plays a 
significant role on the probability of securing external corporate financing from both 
domestic private and foreign banks. The latter perhaps highlights these new banks’ 
attempts to trade cautiously in an uncertain business environment in countries with weak 
institutions. Further, younger small and medium sized enterprises are less likely to be 
networked and are also less likely to have access to various external finances in our 
sample. In other words, business networking forces SMEs to rely more on internal 
finance, thus hindering the process of corporate growth in the region.  
The paper contributes to a limited but growing literature on corporate financing in 
emerging economies. There is generally a consensus in the literature that business 
networks are a feature of the organizational landscape of many countries though their 
                                                 
1 Our attempt to include recently released 2008 BEEPS data in the panel analysis failed as 2008 round does 
not provide information on firm’s affiliation to business associations.   3
nature and effects may vary across the world. Kali (1999) argued that these networks 
absorb honest individuals and raise the density of dishonest individuals engaged in 
anonymous market exchange, which in turn may harm public interest. Consequently, the 
payoff from market exchange may lower. Along similar lines Khawaja and Mian (2005) 
examines the link between political connection of firms and bank lending in Pakistan 
between 1996-2002. They found that political firms borrow 45% more and also have 50% 
higher default rates and this preferential treatment of political firms largely occur in states 
banks in the country. In contrast, cross-country studies on social capital and economic 
growth (e.g., see Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley 2000) have generally highlighted the 
positive impact of active membership in social organization to economic growth. There is 
a limited but growing literature on corporate financing in CEE region. For example, Fries 
and Taci (2002) examine the limits to banking reform while Klapper, Sarria-Allende, and 
Sulla (2002) have highlighted the financial constraint faced by the SMEs. De Haas et al. 
(2007) specifically examine bank’s customer choice in transition countries and identify 
the lack of coverage of foreign and large domestic banks to offer loans to SMEs. Second, 
there is some literature highlighting the lack of social capital in transition region (e.g., see 
Raiser (1999), Paldam and Svedsen (2000, 2001)) that largely focused on measuring the 
stock of social capital, determinants of social capital and also its impact on economic 
development and growth in the region usually at the national level. We are however not 
aware of any study that analyses the role of business networks on firm external financing 
opportunities in the transition region. We integrate two strands of the literature, one on 
corporate finance and, the second one on social capital and economic development, to 
examine the effect of business networks on corporate financing opportunities in CEE 
region.  
It is an important exercise because it would allow us to identify a possible micro-
economic mechanism through which social networking could influence corporate 
financial opportunities in the region. Given that these countries are undergoing radical 
institutional restructuring, it is also important that the informal institutions (e.g., some 
business networks) remain compatible with the formal institutions so as to minimise the 
possible costs of corruption and tax evasion and boost economic growth in the region. We   4
thus hope that this research will inform policy makers to take steps to ease SME’s access 
to external corporate financing opportunities from new banks. 
The chapter is developed as follows. Section 2 explains the data and hypotheses 
while section 3 develops the empirical methodology. Sections 4 analyses the results and 
the final section concludes. 
 
 
2. DATA & HYPOTHESIS 
Our analysis is primarily based on the EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2005 data.
2 Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (“BEEPS”) is a joint initiative of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) and the World Bank Group. The survey, was 
administered to a random sample of 11814 enterprises in 28 countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (“CEE”) (including Turkey) and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (“CIS”), to examine the quality of the business environment as determined by a 
wide range of interactions between firms and the state, to assess the environment for 
private enterprise and business development. For further details of the data, see EBRD 
(2005). For one particular section of our analysis we also make use of the panel element 
of 2002 and 2005 BEEPS data (see footnote 1 and also section 3.3) 
 
2.1. Data Description 
For the purpose of our study we create a sub-sample comprising only of firms in the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries – Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This gave rise to a sample 
of 5040 firms, representing about 52% of all firms that participated in the 2005 BEEPS 
survey. The country distribution of our sample of firms is shown in Table 1, which 
                                                 
2 Later we shall make use of 2002 and 2005 BEEPS data to check the robustness of our cross-section 
estimates using 2005 BEEPS data.   5
suggests that firms in Poland make up the largest proportion of our sample at 19.35%, 
followed by Hungary, Romania and Czech Republic. 
Using the labour force size information contained in the BEEPS data, we classify 
firms into three categories, namely, ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’.
3 We merge small and 
medium sized firms together and label them as small and medium enterprises or SME in 
short; the latter allows us to distinguish SMEs from the top 25% firms with respect to 
financing choices. About 91% of sample firms are small and medium sized enterprises 
(see Table 1); in other words only about 9% sample firms could be classified as ‘large’ 
according to their employment size. Rise of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
CEE countries could be attributed to the break-up of large state-owned enterprises, 
initiated at the beginning of the transition process. 
Following Klapper et al (2002), firms with an age of 10 years or less, i.e, those 
that came into existence after the year 1995, were defined as ‘young’. 49% of small firms 
in our sample fall into the category of young firms. It also means that large firms are not 
necessarily old firms. The average proportion of SMEs and young firms for each of the 
sample countries are also shown in Table 1.  
Using the identity of the largest owner, we also classify firms by ownership 
structure: (a) state, when largest shareholder is government or government agency; (b) 
private domestic, when the largest shareholder is individual/family, general public, and 
domestic company); (c) foreign, when largest shareholder is a foreign company. In a 
similar fashion, we can also identify the banks lending to the sample firms as state, 
domestic private commercial and foreign. Table 2 cross-tabulates ownership structure of 
firms and banks providing loans to these firms. Of the firms that borrow from banks, 
borrowing from domestic private commercial banks is most common, irrespective of firm 
ownership type (state-owned, foreign-owned or private domestically owned). There also 
seems to be some firm-bank ownership matching, as private domestic firms are more 
likely to use domestic private commercial banks. Note that the borrowing from state-
                                                 
3 Other studies notably, Bevan and Danbolt (2004) have used log of sales to proxy for this and Gonzalez et 
al (2007) used natural log of firm total assets.    6
banks is not so common in 2005; but again, relatively higher proportion of state-owned 
firms borrows from state banks. 
  BEEPS data also provides information on whether a firm is affiliated to any 
business association, which plays a significant role in our analysis. Table 1 shows the 
proportion of firms affiliated to business association in the sample countries, which 
clearly highlights some pronounced inter-country variation. While Czech Republic has 
only 21% affiliated firms in our sample, the proportion rises to as high as 91% in 
Slovenia closely followed by 88% in Albania. Note that the nature of most business 
associations in the Balkan countries like Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro are likely to be different from those in most other countries in the CEE 
region.
4 The model of business representation in the Balkan countries was adapted from 
the "continental" chamber systems in the sense of being based on compulsory 
membership. Membership is usually automatic upon the official incorporation of an 
enterprise or the licensing of entrepreneurial activity (Duvanova, 2008). Thus in an 
attempt to test the robustness of our estimates, we also create a Balkan dummy that takes 
a value 1 for the subsample Balkan countries, namely, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and Slovenia and is zero otherwise.  
Networked firms may benefit in a number of ways from their affiliation to the 
business association including lobbying the government (82.5% of networked firms), 
resolving disputes (83.5% of networked firms), information on domestic/international 
product and input markets (about 90% firms), accrediting quality standards of the product 
(89% of networked firms) and getting information on government regulation (about 91% 
of networked firms). The latter in turn suggests that the business association membership 
variable is likely to be endogenous to firm financing, especially when the firms whose 
associations provide networking-type services (e.g., "information or contacts on domestic 
…markets"). 
Our analysis solely considers firm finance for new investment, which funds future 
growth opportunities. In the BEEPS survey, firm managers were requested to provide 
information on sources of finance including internal funds/retained earnings, equity, 
                                                 
4 Our empirical analysis attempts to control for this.   7
domestic private commercial bank borrowing, foreign bank borrowing, state-owned bank 
borrowing (including state development banks), loans from family/friends, money lenders 
or other informal sources, trade credit from suppliers, trade credit from customers, credit 
cards, leasing arrangement, the Government (other than state-owned banks) and other, for 
their establishments new fixed investments (i.e., new land, buildings, machinery, 
equipment, etc). We aggregate the available information to create four categories of 
financing sources: internal finance, bank finance (when firm obtains loans from any bank, 
domestic private commercial, state or foreign), equity finance and any non-bank finance; 
the latter refers to trade credit from suppliers or customers, credit cards, and leasing 
arrangement. Thus external sources of financing in our sample refer to bank loans, equity 
financing or any type of non-bank financing. 
Table 3 summarizes the sources of firm financing for new investment in the selected 
countries in 2005. Note however that some firms tend to obtain financing from more than 
one source (internal, external or both). Accordingly, Table 4 shows the proportion of 
firms relying solely on any type of internal or external financing. Clearly reliance on 
external financing is rather limited in our sample as a significant proportion of firms rely 
solely on internal finance.  In fact about 39% sample firms relied only on internal finance 
for new investment in 2005 in all countries taken together, though there is some inter-
country variation as highlighted in Table 3. Reliance on equity funding is rather limited 
as equity markets continue to be rather under-developed in these countries. A small 
proportion (1% - 12%) of firms relied solely on bank or equity financing or trade credit. 
In the presence of market imperfections in countries with weak institutions, one possible 
way to reduce costs related to adverse selection in bank lending would be to adhere to 
ownership matching between firms and banks (e.g., see Berger et al. 2006). EBRD report 
(2006) suggests a form of bank-firm matching between large firms and foreign banks in a 
selected number of transition countries.  
Using firms’ business association membership, we could classify firms into 
networked and other non-networked firms. Table 5 compares selected characteristics of 
networked firms with other firms and highlights some important characteristics of 
networked firms. In general, older state firms and also foreign firms are significantly 
more likely to be networked, while young SMEs in the domestic private sector are   8
significantly less likely to be networked. In addition, compared to non-networked firms, 
networked firms are more likely to be involved in the export sector. Thus, networked 
firms appear to be in a more advantageous position than other non-networked firms.  
 
2.2. Institutions and Inter-Country Variation 
The harmonious co-existence of firms and financial institutions is dependent on the 
prevailing legal and institutional structures to safeguard and enforce creditors’ rights and 
also to enforce contracts. This has been highlighted in the recent literature. For example, 
La porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1997) find evidence that the legal 
environment as described by both legal rules and their enforcement matters for the size 
and the extent of a country's capital markets. Investor protection was observed to be weak 
in countries with a marked departure of its legal origin from common law
5, and hence 
such countries had smaller and narrower capital markets. La porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Pop-Eleches, & Shleifer (2004) find that judicial independence is an important source of 
economic freedom, which explains part of the persistent finding that such freedom is 
greater in the common law countries. Using a sample of firms drawn from developing 
and developed countries, Beck et al (2002) find that all types of corporate constraints 
including those relating to financial, legal, and corruption do affect firm growth rates 
adversely. The extent of the effect depends very much on firm size: The smallest firms 
are most adversely affected by all these constraints. In addition, they show that firms that 
operate in countries with underdeveloped financial and legal systems and higher levels of 
corruption tend to be more constrained in general. The latter appears to relate to earlier 
work by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), which stressed the importance of the 
financial system and the rule of law for relaxing firms' external financing constraints and 
facilitating their growth. 
In Central and Eastern European as well as the Baltic countries, privatisation and 
institutional reform in the banking sector have advanced in step with the state’s 
withdrawal from the direct provision of banking services and with progress in enterprise 
reform. Shleifer (1997) argues that there has to be a transition of government for a 
                                                 
5 This is English law made by judges and subsequently incorporated into legislature    9
transition to a market economy to take place. This was described as de-politicization of 
the economy, whereby control over resource use and ownership is transferred exclusively 
to the private sector. Government role will then be to provide the necessary institutions to 
support the market economy. This will necessitate the creation of laws and legal 
institutions that protect private property, enforce contracts between private parties, but 
also limit the ability of officials to prey on private property. This will also require the 
creation of regulating institutions that deal with competition, securities markets, banking, 
trade, patents and so on.  
Considering the individual countries, there is evidence of a wide dispersion in the 
institutional quality and reform indices among the 15 countries in our sample. It follows 
from Table 6 that these countries are at different levels of reform and we observe a 
bimodal distribution. Many CEE countries still have a considerable way to reach the 
international levels. This is particularly true for Balkan countries like FYR Macedonia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Albania, many of whom have a 
negative institutional quality index. In contrast, the country with the best institutions was 
Hungary at 8.7 closely followed by Slovenia, Poland, Czech Republic and Estonia 
respectively at 8.5, 7.0, 6.8 and 6.1. Only one-quarter of the countries actually attained 
the highest value 4 of the EBRD Bank reform index including Croatia, Hungary, Czech 
Republic and Estonia. In terms of competition policy only five countries, namely, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovak Republic, Lithuania, and Estonia actually attained the highest level of 
competition policy reform.  
Clearly, quality of institutions could play an important role in the analysis of business 
networking in this paper, as some argue that the need for networking is a mechanism for 
firms to cope with weak institutions. We shall examine the extent to which some of these 
institutional indices may affect firms’ financing choices in transition. 
 
3. Hypothesis and Methodology 
There are often problems of information and incentives, especially in the emerging CEE 
region with weak legal and judicial framework. The borrowers approach financial 
institutions with a view to borrowing funds to invest, but the financial institutions   10
(lenders) cannot be sure as to who the best borrower is. Furthermore, even after loans are 
issued, there are risks of strategic default. The financial institutions (lenders) thus have 
the three-fold task of selecting the best borrower, ensuring efficient use of the loan, and 
also ensuring re-payment of the loan. The task is particularly difficult when legal and 
judicial institutions are weak, giving rise to contract enforcement problems. Accordingly, 
alternative non-market mechanism(s) may surface in an attempt to minimize the possible 
agency costs.  
 
3.1. Hypothesis 
Presence/predominance of informal networks is observed in different kinds of exchanges 
in countries with weak institutions. These networks usually involve an exchange of 
favors, making business easier for the members. While exchange within the networks 
does not rely on explicit written contracts, relationships between the members are guided 
by norms/conventions; norms are nothing but the desirable behaviour subject to sanctions 
in a community (Kandori, 1992). The rationale for pervasive family businesses in east 
Asia is closely linked to the role of trust and family ties in an environment of weak (legal) 
enforceability of contracts and social norms concerning altruism and bequest (Yoshikawa 
& McGuire, 2008). Granovetter (1994) among others shows a recognition for the social 
mechanism in the form of the common family bond in family owned businesses that acts 
to reduce the likelihood of reneging of contracts. Guiso et al (2004) demonstrate the 
effect of social capital on financial development in Italy, while Ayyagari et al (2008) 
suggest the value of the informal sector in a society lacking in quality institutional 
infrastructure. Affiliation to a business association may influence economic activities in 
different ways (see Pyle, 2006). Doner and Schneider (2000) highlight the market 
complementary role of business associations in attempting to overcome various types of 
market imperfections.  
Business groups are common form of business association in many emerging 
economies, especially in Asia. They are a collection of legally distinct firms tied together 
and coordinating on their actions. Member firms are linked in a complex manner, e.g, 
through pyramidal holding, cross ownership or common directorates (Samphantharak,   11
2002; Claessens et al, 2000). Fisman and Khanna (2004) suggested that business groups 
play a role in aiding the economy where social provision of services falls short of the 
required level and are observed to provide an organizational structure that is better suited 
to dealing with the poor availability of basic inputs and services
6 (at the cost of non-
business group firms in a resource constrained economy).  Furthermore, group affiliates 
usually share a common brand identity (e.g, Salim group in Indonesia, the Tata group in 
India, and Samsung in Korea), and may draw on a common labour pool. Members also 
have access to an internal capital market, which in turn ensures an easier access to 
external capital as well. Membership of such a business group with such repute provides 
a platform for networking and thus building social capital by linking to member banks 
and other financial institutions. There is also a parallel need to enforce commitments 
among members to business association. Thus, with a strong business association 
enforcement, banking agreements are more enforceable as the network may ensure that 
loans of its members with banks are re-paid otherwise the network may suffer from lack 
of access to loans from the bank in the future as a bad reputation may then have been 
created with the bank. Business association with weaker enforcement may also exist side 
by side, involving exchange of favours, which make doing businesses easier for those 
within the network. Kali (1999) and Ghatak and Kali (2000, 2001) however argued that 
while affiliation to business networks may facilitate business activities of networked 
firms, it could be inefficient from a general equilibrium perspective. This could be as a 
result of the rent seeking character of networks as highlighted by Olson (1982), as 
networks seek unproductive rents rather than common or public interest.  
BEEPS data allows us to classify firms according to their membership of Business 
Association (BA) (see discussion in section 2.1). As it follows, membership offers 
various networking type of advantages (including lobbying and accessing costly 
information for members) and is distinctly different from well-known Business Groups in 
Asia. Our central hypothesis is that a firm’s affiliation of a Business Association could 
enhance its external financing opportunities. Possible causes of this link would include, 
among others, the following: first, the adverse selection problems of screening potential 
                                                 
6 The ability to shift resources across units is used by a diversified business group to its advantage to 
consolidate its market power across industries (See Cestone and Fumagalli 2001).   12
borrowers are alleviated if a firm belongs to BA as it may allow a lender to obtain 
information regarding a firm’s creditworthiness at lower costs than otherwise. In other 
words, networking may lower the information asymmetry between lender and borrower. 
A further possibility would be that business associations explicitly monitor their members 
and ensure better repayment for banks, thus alleviating the moral hazard problems of 
contract enforcement. From the BEEPS questionnaire it however seems that business 
associations in our sample countries do not explicitly perform this 
monitoring/supervisory role. It could still be the case that a firm’s affiliation to business 
association could also minimize potential moral hazard problems of strategic default 
because of reputation factor within a close-knit network. Without much loss of generality, 
we could thus hypothesize that banks and other organizations may prefer to lend to 
networked firms because it minimizes the underlying agency costs in an uncertain 
environment (because of weak institutions). A second and a related hypothesis is 
therefore to examine whether the role of networks loses its significance when institutional 
quality improves. Given the limited time-series dimension of our data, we could only 
examine this hypothesis by exploiting institutional variation in the cross-section of our 
sample.  
While Bonin and Leven (1996) argued that foreign banks may choose those 
domestic firms who have previously established some international links by virtue of 
their import/export activities, others have focused on banks’ preference to serve large 
firms with more transparent accounting standards. Accounting for Business Association 
membership allows us to clarify this general argument prevailing in the literature. It also 
follows from Table 5 that networking argument is closely linked to these existing 
arguments. In particular, networked firms in our sample are on average more likely to be 
operating in the export sector, and from our sample 68% of networked firms tend to use 
international accounting standards. It also follows from our analysis that minimizing 
agency costs of lending is not only pertinent for foreign banks but also for newly 
privatized domestic banks, especially in the early years of transition towards privatization 
when institutions are weaker and business conditions are uncertain.   
   13
 
3.2.  An empirical model of firm financing choices 
Our first objective is to analyse firm’s financing choices for new investment. As indicated 
in section 2, firms may use different sources of finance including internal finance, bank 
or equity finance or non-bank credit. While a significant proportion of firms rely on 
internal finance only, many firms tend to combine internal and various sources of 
external financing (bank loans, equity and other non-bank sources). Accordingly, we first 
define a variable IFic, which takes a value 1 if the i-th firm in country c relies 100% on 
internal finance and zero otherwise. Suppose the underlying unobserved variable IFic
* is 
given by:  
   IFic
* = α0 + αBA BAic+ αx Xic + αz Zc +  εi   (1) 
Where  is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. While BA refers to i-th 
firm’s affiliation to a Business Association in a given country, X refers to all firm-
specific control variables while Z refers to all country-specific control variables (please 
see below for the exact model specification). Ceteris paribus, we do not expect BA to 
have a significant effect on the likelihood of using internal finance, but in the absence of 
a prior we examine the validity of this null hypothesis.  
What we observe is IFic,  which is related to IFic
*  as follows:  
IFic
  = 1 if  IFic
* >0 
      = 0 if IFic
* ≤ 0
 
 Given the normal distribution of the error term, we use a probit model to determine the 
likelihood of 100% internal financing for new investment in our sample. Since the probit 
coefficient estimates do not reflect the marginal effects of each explanatory variables, we 
determine it separately as the partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent 
variable with respect to the particular explanatory variable in the estimation of equation 
(1). 
It is also important to analyze the factors determining various sources of external 
financing, namely, bank finance, equity finance and non-bank finance, where networking   14
could play an important role. Accordingly, we create three more variables, which take the 
value of 1 if the i-th firm in country c uses any of the three sources of external finance, 
and zero otherwise, as follows:  
BFic = 1, if the i-th firm in country c uses any Bank finance. 
EFic = 1 if the i-th firm in country c uses any equity finance.  
NBFic =1 if the i-th firm in country c uses any non-bank finance (as defined in 
section 2); 
Accordingly, for a given choice of external finance (BF, EF or NBF), generally denoted 
by XF for any source of external finance, we estimate a binary probit model for each of 
the sources of external finance, namely, BF, EF and NBF:   
As before, we assume that the underlying unobservable variable XFi
* for the  i-th firm is 
determined as follows: 
 XFic
* = β0 + βBA BAic+ βx Xic + βz Zc +  ui   (2) 
The observable variable XFic = 1 if XFic
 * > 0 and  
   XFic = 0 otherwise 
As before we assume that the random error term u is normally distributed with mean 0 
and variance 1 and accordingly use a probit model to determine XFi  for each type of 
external financing choice namely bank finance (BF), equity finance  (EF) and non-bank 
finance (NBF).  
Since the probit coefficient estimates do not reflect the marginal effects of each 
explanatory variables, we determine the partial derivative of the expected value of the 
dependent variable (BF, EF or NBF) with respect to the particular explanatory variable in 
each case. 
After controlling for all other factors, an empirical test of our central hypothesis 
pertains to the sign and significance of the coefficient estimates of BA separately for 
bank finance (BF), equity finance (EF) and non-bank finance (NBF). A number of studies 
on banking relationships (e.g., Kali (1999), Ghatak and Kali, (2001)) have recognized the 
importance of business association membership. We thus hypothesize that firms affiliated   15
to business associations are more likely to access bank finance. We are however not 
aware of any prior study that highlights the role of networking for equity finance or other 
kinds of non-bank finance. Thus we empirically explore the role of business association 
membership for accessing different kinds of external finance in our sample. 
  Note however that a firm’s affiliation to a business association is likely to be 
simultaneous to firms’ financing choices. So we need to explore possible instruments in 
this respect. This is discussed in section 3.3. 
We follow the existing literature to choose other firm-specific control variables X 
in each case for estimating equations (1) and (2). Ownership structure of firms (i.e., 
domestic, foreign) could play an important role especially in the context of networking in 
an imperfect world, e.g., see Berger et al (2006) and Detriagache et al (2000). To this 
end, we include controls for state-owned firms, private domestic firms and foreign firms. 
Both firm size and age are observed to determine a firm’s choice of finance. 
Klapper et al (2002), Kumar (2007), Berger and Udell (1995), Beck et al (2002) confirm 
this. Thus we expect young SMEs to have less bank finance. While other studies have 
used log of sales e.g., Bevan and Danbolt (2004), and natural logarithm of the book value 
of the total property assets (e.g. Ooi, 2000), we use labour force size to proxy for firm 
size as explained in section 3.1.  
  Other control variables include growth of fixed assets, prior year research and 
development spending. Given the diverse set of countries in our sample, we also include 
some country-level institutional controls Z including EBRD competition policy index, 
and institutional quality index
7 that may also influence firms’ financing choices (see 
discussion in section 3.2).  
Given that firm’s membership of a business association is likely to be 
significantly higher in most Balkan countries in our sample, we also include a binary 
variable Balkan indicating if the firm is located in a Balkan country. The variable takes a 
value zero otherwise. Finally we interact firm’s business association membership with the 
Balkan dummy to explore the differential effect of business association membership in 
                                                 
7 The use of a composite variable such as institutional quality in our regression enables us to solve the 
problem of multicollinearity that would have resulted had we used individual country level indices.   16
Balkan countries (relative to other sample countries). Since Balkan countries on average 
tend to have weaker institutional quality, significance of this interaction term allows us to 
examine the link between business networks and institutional quality. Inclusion of a 
further interaction term between institution quality and business association enables us to 
enables us to identify a differential effect of networks in countries with weak institution 
quality.   
 
3.3. An empirical model of firms’ choice of banks  
Our second objective is thus to determine firm’s choices of banks belonging to different 
ownership categories, namely, state bank, domestic private commercial bank, and foreign 
bank. Suppose Bijc denotes i-th firm’s choice of j’th bank in country c (where j refers to 
state, domestic private commercial, or foreign banks). For a given choice of j, suppose 
the underlying unobservable variable Bic
 * 
 is determined by:    
Bic
 *= γ0 + γ BA BAic + γ x X2ic  + γ z Z2ic + εi   (3)
 
where the observable variable Bijc is related to Bic
 * as follows: 
Bic = 1 if Bic
 * >0  
Bic = 0 if otherwise 
We determine equation (3) for each type of bank choice (state, domestic private or 
foreign) separately in our sample. Following on from Table 4, we can classify Bic  by 
bank ownership type as follows: borrowing from domestic private commercial bank 
(bank_private), state bank (bank_state) or foreign bank (bank_foreign). These three 
binary variables are defined as follows:  
Bank_private=1 if a firm borrows from a domestic private commercial bank and 
zero otherwise. 
Bank_state=1 if a firm borrows from a domestic state bank and zero otherwise  
Bank_foreign=1 if a firm borrows from a foreign bank and zero otherwise    17
Given the binary nature of these variables, we use probit models to determine these three 
bank choice variables using equation (3). 
As with equations (1) and (2), our central hypothesis here is to check if a firm’s 
affiliation to business association is particularly important for loans from a particular type 
of bank classified by its ownership (i.e., state, domestic private commercial, foreign). 
This is closely related to the literature on foreign banks’ entry in developing and 
transition economies (e.g., see Bonin and Leven 1996; Bonin et al. 1998). In particular, 
there is suggestion that foreign banks tend to lend to borrowers with better accounting 
and reporting standards (and thus may prefer foreign firms) or with those firms who have 
established international links by virtue of their import/export activities. In an uncertain 
foreign environment foreign banks may choose networked firms with a view to lower 
their agency costs. This is related the concept of firm-bank ownership matching as 
observed by Berger et al. (2006) for India. Following on this, we examine whether 
foreign firms are more likely to borrow from foreign banks while state-owned firms are 
more likely to borrow from state banks in our sample of CEE countries.  
We however do not have a prior as to how business association membership could 
influence firm’s choice of banks for private domestic or state banks and therefore we 
empirically explore it in our analysis. Given the potential endogeneity problem of a 
firm’s affiliation to a business association we instrument this variable (see discussion in 
section 3.3). As before, we also interact firm’s business association membership with the 
Balkan dummy to explore the differential effect of business association membership in 
Balkan countries (relative to other sample countries), if any.  
The set of firm-specific control variables X2 has some common variables as in X 
in section 3.1 above; for example, we continue to include control for SMEs, young firms, 
interaction between SME and young, firm ownership type and firms’ affiliation to 
business association, growth of assets. As before, we also have a set of institutional 
control Z2.  As we focus on banking relationship only, we now replace competition 
policy index by EBRD bank reform index with a view to explore the effect of bank   18
reform on firms’ access to state, private domestic and private foreign banks.
8 Table 7 
provides an overview of explanatory variables employed in both our firm financing 
choice and bank choice regressions 
 
3.4. Addressing possible endogeneity of firm’s affiliation to business networks 
A potential problem with the identification of networked firms is that firms’ affiliation to 
a business network is likely to be endogenous. This is because firms may choose to 
belong to a network with a view to facilitate its financing access (see discussion in 
section 2); thus networked firms are unlikely to be random among all sample firms. 
Accordingly, there remains an important selection problem to be addressed here. It is 
difficult to address this endogeneity problem using single cross-section data. One 
possibility would be to generate an instrument for firm’s affiliation to a business network. 
To this end, we first use a probit model to determine sample firm’s affiliation to a 
business network; we choose potentially time invariant explanatory variables like SME, 
young and firm ownership categories and generate the predicted value of the variable as a 
possible instrument for a firm’s affiliation to a business association.  In doing so, we need 
to ensure some exclusion restriction here to minimise the possibility of endogeneity bias 
in estimating equations (1)-(3). In particular, we argue that unlike firm financing 
opportunities, growth of fixed assets and research and development spending are not 
pertinent in the determination of first stage BA membership equation so that they are 
excluded from the first stage regression. Further we  include a sector control, namely, if a 
firm is involved in export sector in determining firm’s membership of business 
association, which is not included in equations (1)-(3). Finally, we include a Balkan 
dummy to examine the differential effect of Balkan countries in business networking. 
Probit marginal effects estimates of business association membership as shown in Table 8 
highlights the fact that the likelihood of business networking is significantly higher 
among foreign firms, exporting firms and also those from the Balkan countries while it is 
lower for small and medium sized enterprises. We generate the fitted value of this 
regression as an instrument for firms’ business association membership to be used in 
                                                 
8 We included all institutional variables in an alternative specification; but the competition index was never 
significant. Thus the final specification does not include competition index.   19
estimating firms’ financing opportunities equations (1)-(3). 
It is however difficult to address this selection issue convincingly in a single 
cross-section data-set that we have used so far. One possible alternative is to make use of 
the available panel information of firms for 2002 and 2005, although the latter 
considerably reduces the sample size (note that the two year BEEPS panel data 
corresponds to only about 15.35% of our total observations in BEEPS 2005). These are 
the firms initially surveyed in the BEEPS 2002 round and then were re-surveyed in 
BEEPS 2005, having expressed a desire to be involved in the 2005 BEEPS round.
9 The 
firms were identified through a firm identity number allocated to such firms in the 
BEEPS 2005 survey round. In particular about 859 firms in fifteen selected countries are 
included in this panel, giving rise to 1718 observations in total for the two rounds 
considered. The underlying idea is that ceteris paribus variation of firm characteristics 
over these two years 2002 and 2005, would allow us to identify the causal effect of 
business association membership on firms’ financing opportunities equations (1)-(3). We 
construct very similar regression variables used in the cross-section analysis of equations 
(1)-(3). Means and standard deviations of these variables are shown in Table A2, which 
highlights their comparability with 2005 data used in the cross-section analysis.  
One could use this panel data to estimate fixed effects logit model to determine i-th firm’s 
financing choice (wholly (100%) internal finance, bank finance, equity finance and Non-
bank finance) for new investment in year t, t=2002, 2005, in country c,  in terms of 
lagged value of business affiliation as one of the possible covariates X. We assume that 
the underlying unobserved variable Yict
* is determined by:    
Yict
 *= Ψ0 + Ψ BA BAit + Ψ x Xit + Ψ z Zict + Ωi+  еit   (4) 
such that  




                                                 
9  Firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although surveyed in 2005, were either not surveyed in 2002 or 
refused to be involved in the BEEPS round of 2005 having participated in BEEPS 2002.   20
In this respect, we choose four Ys pertaining to firm’s financing choice of wholly internal 
finance, bank finance, equity finance, and non-bank finance (each of them being a binary 
variable) and run four separate fixed effects logit models (see discussion in section 4.3). 
There are two error terms in the model – one firm-specific (time invariant) Ωi and the 
other еit that varies not only across firms but also over time. The firm-specific fixed 
effects  Ωis allow us to control for firm-specific unobserved variables, which in turn 
minimises the estimation bias arising out of firm-level unobserved heterogeneity, thus 
justifying the use of the fixed effects logit model. 
In similar fashion, we use our panel data to estimate fixed effects logit models to 
determine i-th firm’s choice of banks Bict in year t (t=2002, 2005) in country c.  
Suppose the underlying unobserved variable Bict
* is determined by:    
Bict
 *= δ0 + δ BA BAit + δ x X2it + δ z Z2it + Fi+  vit   (5) 
Such that the observable variable Bict is related to the unobservable Bict
* as 
follows: 
Bict = 1 if Bict
 * >0    
Bict = 0 if otherwise 
 
As before, we choose three Bs pertaining to firm’s choice of state banks, domestic private 
commercial banks and foreign banks (each of them being a binary variable) and run three 
fixed effects logit models (see discussion in section 4.3) for each case. There are two 
error terms in the model – one firm-specific (time invariant) Fi and the other it that 
varies not only across firms but also over time. The model not only determines the 
parameter estimates δ and also their marginal effects. Firm-specific fixed effects Fis 
would allow us to control for firm-specific unobserved variables. In other words, we use 
fixed effects logit models to determine equations (4) and (5), which in turn minimize the 
potential endogeneity bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity in the data. We can 
thus consider the fixed effects panel (2002-2005) data estimates to be superior to the 
single cross section estimates for 2005 BEEPS sample.   21
As before, we include similar firm and country-specific explanatory variables in 
both fixed effects models captured by equations (4) and (5) above. Naturally the time 
invariant factors are dropped from the models. We include firm’s association to business 
association and growth of fixed assets. Since it has been argued that business association 
membership has been a response to institutional weakness, we also include an interaction 
between business association membership and institutional quality index, and check for 
the significance of t-statistic of the interaction term. In fact, statistical insignificance of 
the interaction term in both fixed effects models, would highlight the fact that business 
association membership is not crucial for firm financing and bank choice, in countries 
with high quality institutions.    
 
 
4. RESULTS  AND  ANALYSIS 
First we determine the likelihood of a firm’s affiliation to business enterprise; these 
estimates are summarized in Table 8 (see discussion in section 3). We generate the 
predicted value of business association from these estimates and use this predicted value 
as an instrument in the cross-section probit estimates of firm’s financing choices (see 
section 4.1) and also probit estimates of firm’s choice of banks (see section 4.2) as 
summarized in Table 9 and Table 10 respectively. Table 11 shows the panel logit fixed 
effects estimates for firms’ 4 financing choices for new fixed investment, while Table 12 
provides the panel logit fixed effects estimates for firms’ access to loans from private 
domestic and foreign banks (see section 4.3). 
10 
 
4.1.   Determinants of Firm Financing Choices for New Investment 
 Table 9 summarises the probit estimates of firm financing choices. Columns 1 shows 
probit marginal effects of the probability of firms having 100% internal finance while 
                                                 
10  We use STATA to run the regression models, which automatically drops the firms with missing 
observations, thus resulting in a lesser number of observations than we initially began with. 
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columns 2-4 show the probit marginal effects of firm’s share of bank finance, non-bank 
finance and equity finance. Significance of the likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic in 
each case confirms the goodness of fit of these estimated models. 
Given that the estimated coefficients do not reflect the marginal effects of our 
explanatory variables, we compute the marginal effects and report them in the table. This 
enables us to examine the magnitude of the marginal effect of each of the explanatory 
variables on the particular dependent variable in question.  
As dummy variables taking the values of 1 and 0 dominate our selection of 
exogenous explanatory variables of interest, such as small and medium enterprises or 
foreign ownership of firms, their reported marginal effect is the difference in predicted 
value for the dependent variable (e.g., probability of firm financing by internal finance) 
for a dummy variable of 1 versus 0, with all other exogenous variables at their means. On 
the other hand, the marginal effects for the continuous exogenous variables are the 
derivatives of the predicted dependent variable for small changes in the exogenous 
variables. 
Since a significant proportion of sample firms relied on internal finance, we 
estimated the determinants of the likelihood of securing 100% internal finance. Clearly 
firms affiliated to business association are significantly less likely to rely fully on internal 
finance; the same result holds even when institutional quality improves (note that the 
interaction between institutional quality and business association is negative and 
significant). While firms in Balkan countries are significantly more likely to rely on 
100% internal finance, networked firms in Balkan countries are significantly less likely to 
do so as the interaction term between Balkan and business association is negative and 
significant. Finally, firms from countries with more stringent competition policy are less 
likely to rely solely on 100% internal finance, thus highlighting the importance of market 
reform on corporate financing opportunities. 
It is however more interesting to consider the probit estimates of the likelihood of 
access to bank/non-bank finance as well as equity finance (see columns 2-4).  These 
estimates (except for that of equity finance) are generally consistent with our central 
hypothesis that affiliation to business networks significantly improves firms’ access to all   23
types of external finance in our sample of emerging economies with weaker institutions. 
Firms from countries with better institutions tend to have less bank or non-bank finance. 
However, institutional quality appears not to be important for firm financing for new 
fixed investment, by equity. Even for countries with better institutional quality, business 
association membership tends to significantly enhance access to bank and non-bank 
finance in our sample.   
Other results: Firms with growing fixed assets tend to have more bank credit 
while R&D spending remains insignificant. Firm size is important too. SMEs are more 
likely to secure bank loans and hence rely less on internal finance. This may be the result 
of SMEs having increased access to bank finance following the advent of bank reforms in 
CEE countries, which saw private banks respond to firms demand for credit. Note 
however that the marginal effect of bank finance for SME’s is only about 9% (compared 
to about 20% for networked firms) though the effect is significant only at 10% level. The 
firm age does not however appear to be important here. 
 
4.2. Determinants of Firm’s Choice of Banks 
As in the previous sub-section, we outline the marginal effects of our probit model 
determining firm’s choice of banks between state bank, domestic private commercial 
banks and foreign banks; these estimates are shown in Table 10. Our diagnostic tests 
confirm the goodness of fit of the estimated probit model in this respect. 
  While business association membership is insignificant for firms’ access to loans 
from state bank, the coefficient of the variable is positive and significant for firms 
borrowing not only from domestic private commercial bank, but also from foreign banks. 
In other words, affiliation to business association is conducive to securing loans 
particularly from new domestic and foreign private banks, who face uncertain business 
conditions, especially in countries with weaker institutional environment in our sample. 
With the improvement in institutional quality, business association affiliation continues to 
be significant and positive for firms’ access to loans from domestic state and private 
banks, though not for loans from foreign banks. Compared to other sample countries, 
access to state banks is limited in Balkan countries; while access to domestic private   24
commercial banks is significant more pronounced. Membership of business association is 
however particularly not of relevance for firms’ finance from various banks operating in 
Balkan countries. 
  It is evident that state banks’ role has been curtailed by the recent reform and as 
such state firms are less likely to borrow from all three categories (state, domestic private 
commercial and foreign) of banks. However foreign firms are less likely to borrow from 
domestic private commercial banks, while the estimated coefficient is insignificant for 
loans from state and foreign banks. In contrast, we find no evidence of domestic private 
commercial banks being more or less likely to borrow from any type of bank. In other 
words, evidence of firm-bank ownership matching is rather weak in our sample.  
While the coefficient of growth of fixed assets is positive for all bank categories, 
it is significant only for loans from the domestic private commercial bank and foreign 
bank categories; the latter reflects the importance of satisfying some efficiency 
requirement in the allocation of private commercial bank loans.  
After controlling for all other factors, it appears that SMEs are significantly more 
likely to borrow from domestic private commercial banks, while the coefficient of small 
and medium enterprises remains insignificant for loans from state and foreign banks. As 
in Table 9, the marginal effect of bank finance from domestic private banks for SMEs is 
only about 6% while that for business association membership is about 17%. In other 
words, despite some progress, business networking tends to raise barriers to access bank 
financing for small and medium enterprises in our sample.  
 
4.3. Fixed effects panel data estimates of firm financing and firms’ choice of banks 
Finally, in an attempt to test the robustness of our estimates, we use panel data to estimate 
firm’s financing choices and also firms’ access to loans from state, private and foreign 
banks respectively. In this respect, we are particularly interested in fixed effects estimates 
that minimises the endogeneity bias arising from inclusion of unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity into the model. Since only logit (and not probit) models are amenable to 
fixed effects estimates,  Table 11 shows the logit fixed effects estimates (marginal 
effects) of firm’s access to 100% internal finance, and also any access to bank finance,   25
non-bank finance and equity finance. Table 12 summarizes the corresponding marginal 
effects estimates of the firms’ choice of state, domestic private and foreign banks. 
Naturally the time invariant factors are dropped from these fixed effects models  
  Clearly, fixed effects estimates (marginal effects) of firms’ internal and external 
financing choices shown in Table 11 support the significance of business association 
membership for obtaining bank finance and non-bank finance only. As with the single 
cross-section estimates, the networking variable turns out to be insignificant for equity 
financing. An improvement in institutional quality is associated with lower likelihood of 
firms accessing non-bank finance though the effect is insignificant for access to bank 
finance. Thus, networking is associated with greater non-bank finance, while it paves into 
insignificance for bank financing as and when institutional quality improves.  
Next we move on to Table 12, summarizing the marginal effects estimates of 
firms’ access to loans from state, private or foreign banks.  As with single cross-section 
analysis, business association membership significantly enhances the likelihood of firms 
borrowing from private and foreign banks, but not from state banks. In particular, among 
firms with access to bank loans, a networked firm (relative to a non-networked firm) is 
0.75 percentage points more likely to borrow from a private commercial banks; by the 
same token, a networked firm is 1.34 percentage points more likely to borrow from 
foreign banks, even after controlling for all other possible covariates. The networking 
effect is less pronounced for loans from domestic private commercial banks (relative to 
foreign banks), which contrasts the cross-section estimates. Note also that compared to 
the cross-section estimates (Table 10), marginal effects of networking are smaller in 
panel data estimates (0.75% as opposed to 17% for private domestic banks and 1.34% as 
opposed to 6% for foreign banks).  
Further, considering the subsample of firms with access to bank loans, differential 
effect of networking vanishes (Table 12) for access to loans from private banks as 
institutional quality improves. The latter can be contrasted with the single cross-section 
estimates shown in Table 10. The latter could reflect the potential role of time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity as in the panel data analysis. However the fact remains that the 
size of our panel sample is rather small; it would be interesting to see if these results hold 
in larger samples too.    26
  
 
5. CONCLUDING  COMMENTS 
Financial intermediation may not always guarantee efficient utilization of credit, 
especially if there are market imperfections and institutional weaknesses. In this respect, 
the present paper explores a possible mechanism through which social capital could 
affect financing of investment and thereby encouraging growth of business enterprises. In 
particular, the paper focuses on the role of business networks on firms’ access to external 
finance in selected CEE countries.  
Following the recent institutional economics literature and also that of 
organizational behaviour, we argue that informal networks are a response to inadequate 
institutions and imperfect markets that persist despite ongoing reforms. Firms’ 
association with informal business networks may help them secure external finances in 
countries with weak institutions. Results from a sample of CEE transition countries do 
confirm the positive role of business networks for network participants. In particular there 
is evidence that affiliation to business association significantly boosts networked firms’ 
access to bank loans, even after controlling for all possible factors. Positive role of 
networks for network participants is particularly evident for firms borrowing from 
domestic private commercial banks and also foreign banks. The effect is robust in both 
single cross-section and panel data analysis, though there is some evidence that single 
cross-section estimates tend to over-estimate the effect of business networks. In the 
process non-networked small and medium enterprises are discriminated against, despite 
various on-going reforms. 
Forming networks to secure bank loans and other business facilities may not 
necessarily be an efficient arrangement for the broader economy, as it may promote the 
interests of those networked firms who are successful to belong to good networks through 
family/political connections or otherwise, but are not necessarily more efficient firms. 
Thus contrary to the common wisdom, social capital may not necessarily be a welfare 
improving arrangement. We hope future research will address this.    27
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Tables 








young firms in 
each country 
Percentage of firms 
with Business 
Association 
membership in each 
country 
SMEs as a 
proportion of total 
firms in each 
country 
FYR of Macedonia  200  4.0%  47.00%  41.00%  90.00% 
Serbia and Montenegro  300  6.0%  42.67%  58.00%  86.33% 
Albania 204  4.0%  61.76%  88.00%  92.65% 
Croatia 236  4.7%  27.97%  82.00%  86.02% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  200  4.0%  57.50%  52.00%  90.00% 
Slovenia 223  4.4%  21.97%  91.00%  87.44% 
Poland 975  19.3%  37.47%  30.00%  92.92% 
Hungary 610  12.1%  41.64%  54.00%  91.97% 
Czech rep  343  6.8%  49.11%  21.00%  92.13% 
Slovak rep  220  4.4%  43.64%  34.00%  90.00% 
Romania 600  11.9%  38.00%  54.00%  90.17% 
Bulgaria 300  6.0%  44.00%  43.00%  90.00% 
Latvia 205  4.1%  54.15%  26.00%  89.76% 
Lithuania 205  4.1%  46.83%  32.00%  90.24% 
Estonia 219  4.3%  45.21%  48.00%  90.41% 
Total 5040  100.0%  n/a  n/a  90.58% 
The distribution of firms in sample countries. Data is obtained from the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2005 Data survey. Patterns also observable are the various cross-
country dissimilarities in young firms, Networked firms, and firms of Small and Medium Enterprise size, where firm size is defined by the 
number of employees. Our sample comprises 5040 firms in total of which 90.58% comprise SMEs. This suggests the growth in SMEs in Central 
and Eastern European countries owing to the transition country reforms. Furthermore, our sample represents some of the countries at an 
advanced stage in their reform process, notably, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania.   31
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TOTAL  51 75  835 
The choice of bank type patronized for loans, by the three types of firms prevalent in our data set. This represents a smaller 
sub-sample of our original data set as it reflects only those firms that patronize, state banks, domestic private  commercial 
banks, and foreign banks. Figures in brackets refer to the proportions of firm ownership by each owner obtaining loans 
(funding) from each of the three types of banks. It is constructed from the BEEPS 2005 questions 45 a17 to 45a19, which 
asked the respondents what proportion of their firm’s new fixed investment has been financed by borrowing from domestic 
private commercial banks, borrowing from foreign banks, and borrowing from state-owned banks (including state 
development banks). Total firms borrowing from banks in our sample are 961 Firms and firm ownership is mutually 
exclusive. Note however, that while firm ownership is mutually exclusive, bank borrowing is not, and so the same type of 
firm can borrow from more than one type of bank. We have three types of firms: State-owned banks, Foreign firms, and 
domestic private firms (comprising individual-owned firms, family-owned firms, general public-owned and domestic 
company-owned firms. Here ownership refers to the firm owner type with the majority of shareholding of all the 
shareholders in the firm.   
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Table 3: Distribution of firms by source of financing for New Fixed Investment 
 
Country  Source of Finance  Total  Internal Bank  Non-Bank  Equity  Other 
FYROM (Macedonia) 
85 18  8  4  23  200 
  (42.50%) (9.00%)  (4.00%)  (2.00%)  (11.50%) 
Serbia and Montenegro 
188 50  14  2 22  300  (62.67%) (16.67%)  (4.67%) (0.67%)  (7.33%) 
Albania 
162 57  6  0  7  204 
  (79.41%) (27.94%)  (2.94%) (0.00%)  (3.43%) 
Croatia 
130 70  32  15  15  236  (55.08%) (29.66%)  (13.56%)  (6.36%) (6.36%) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
79 35  12  0 8  200  (39.50%) (17.50%)  (6.00%) (0.00%)  (4.00%) 
Slovenia 
136 66  20  1 17  223  (60.99%) (29.60%)  (8.97%) (0.45%)  (7.62%) 
Poland  
733 202  112  13 98  975  (75.18%) (20.72%)  (11.49%)  (1.33%)  (10.05%) 
Hungary 
304 136  88  106  51  610  (49.84%) (22.30%)  (14.43%) (17.38%)  (8.36%) 
Czech rep 
186 39  71  36  69  343  (54.23%) (11.37%)  (20.70%) (10.50%)  (20.12%) 
Slovak rep 
115 29  38  25  18  220  (52.27%) (13.18%)  (17.27%) (11.36%)  (8.18%) 
Romania 
433 139  93  3  59  600  (72.17%) (23.17%)  (15.50%)  (0.50%) (9.83%) 
Bulgaria 
184 74  32  2 39  300  (61.33%) (24.67%)  (10.67%)  (0.67%)  (13.00%) 
Latvia 
74 31  28 33  15  205  (36.10%) (15.12%)  (13.66%) (16.10%)  (7.32%) 
Lithuania 
126 32  65  6 20  205  (61.46%) (15.61%)  (31.71%)  (2.93%) (9.76%) 
Estonia 
138 39  60  3 19  219  (63.01%) (17.81%)  (27.40%)  (1.37%) (8.68%) 
The distribution of firms by source of financing for new fixed investment. Source of data is World Bank/ EBRD 
BEEPS 2005 data. Figures in tables above refer to the number of firms using the various sources of financing for 
new investment, and so firms may be observed to use more than one source of financing. Therefore, proportions 
in table above may not add up to 100% in certain countries. Figures in brackets refer to number of firms in each 
category as a proportion of total firms in each country.  
The above  table is constructed from the 2005 BEEPs data questions Q45a15 to Q45a27 which asked respondents 
what proportion of firms new fixed investment have been financed from internal funds, equity, borrowing from 
local commercial banks, borrowing from foreign banks, borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
Development banks, loans from family and friends, Money lenders or other informal sources, trade credit from 
suppliers, trade credit from customers, credit cards, leasing arrangement, The Government (other than state-
owned banks), and other. A Firm’s borrowing from internal funds constitutes the firm’s financing of new 
investment by internal financing, Firms borrowing from banks is the summation of the proportions of financing 
obtained from each of the individual types of banks -  domestic private commercial banks, foreign banks, and 
state-owned banks. Firm’s non-bank financing for new investment is obtained by the summation of firms 
financing for new investment from trade credit from suppliers, trade credit from customers, credit cards, and 
leasing arrangement.  A firm finances new fixed investment by equity if it obtains any proportion of financing by 
the issue of new shares. The column above referred to as “other”, is the summation of firms proportions of 
sources of finance for new fixed investment from loans from family and friends, money lenders or other informal 
sources, The government (other than state-owned banks), and other.  
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Table 4: Distribution of firms reliance on a single source of finance for new fixed 
investment across sample countries 
 
Country  Source of Finance  Total 
Internal Bank  Non-Bank  Equity  Other 
FYROM (Macedonia) 
70 9  0  2  15  200 
  (35.00%) (4.50%)  (0.00%)  (1.00%)  (7.50%) 
Serbia and Montenegro 
142 10  3  2  7  300  (47.33%) (3.33%)  (1.00%)  (0.67%)  (2.33%) 
Albania 
108 11  0  0  1  204  (52.94%) (5.39%)  (0.00%)  (0.00%)  (0.49%) 
Croatia 
68 20  4  3 2  236  (28.81%) (8.47%)  (1.69%)  (1.27%)  (0.85%) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
55 14  0  0 2  200  (27.50%) (7.00%)  (0.00%)  (0.00%)  (1.00%) 
Slovenia 
64 10  2  0 5  223  (28.70%) (4.48%)  (0.90%)  (0.00%)  (2.24%) 
Poland  
472 23  12  1 23  975  (48.41%) (2.36%)  (1.23%)  (0.10%)  (2.36%) 
Hungary 
190 37  17  46 6  610  (31.15%) (6.07%)  (2.79%)  (7.54%)  (0.98%) 
Czech rep 
113 11  17  11  38  343  (32.94%) (3.21%)  (4.96%)  (3.21%)  (11.08%) 
Slovak rep 
75 8  8 10  5  220  (34.09%) (3.64%)  (3.64%)  (4.55%)  (2.27%) 
Romania 
276 33  11  1 13  600  (46.00%) (5.50%)  (1.83%)  (0.17%)  (2.17%) 
Bulgaria 
120 22  8  0  6  300  (40.00%) (7.33%)  (2.67%)  (0.00%)  (2.00%) 
Latvia 
46 11  4  18  7  205  (22.44%) (5.37%)  (1.95%)  (8.78%)  (3.41%) 
Lithuania 
75 7  24 4  5  205  (36.59%) (3.41%)  (11.71%) (1.95%)  (2.44%) 
Estonia 
68 4  4  2  3  219  (31.05%) (1.83%)  (1.83%)  (0.91%)  (1.37%) 
Distribution of firm’s reliance on a single source of financing across sample countries. Source of data is World 
Bank/ EBRD BEEPS 2005 data.  All sources of finance are as earlier defined in the preceding table 3. The figures 
in tables above refer to the number of firms financed 100% by either of the sources of finance – Internal finance, 
bank finance, non-bank finance, equity finance, and other. Figures in brackets refer to number of firms in each 
category as a proportion of total firms in each country. Note that proportions will not add up to 100% in all 
countries as not all firms will use 100% of any type of finance in sample countries. Clearly, most firms are 100% 




Table 5. Comparison of networked and Non-networked firms 
 





SME 5040  0.8419  0.9631  -14.569*** 
Young 5034  0.3428  0.4934  -10.954*** 
Private 5040  0.7227  0.8291  -9.069*** 
State 4906  0.1065  0.0666  4.945*** 
Foreign 5040  0.0864  0.0377  7.129*** 
Growth of fixed assets  4883  127.53  31.34  4.837*** 
Research and 
Development spending 
3163 46.5764  10.4931 5.664*** 
Exports 5027  0.4008  0.2167  14.324*** 
International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) 
5040 0.2752  0.1148  14.577*** 
Independent Sample Means Test. T-Test for the Significance of the Difference between the Means of Two independent 
Samples - Networked firms and non-networked firms, based on selected firm characteristics. Our data sample 
comprises a total of 5040 firms drawn from 15 CEE countries. However, on account of observations missing for a 
number of firms, the number of firms either in possession or not in possession of selected firm characteristics, vary 
across countries. A negative significant t-statistic indicates that Networked firms are less likely to possess the firm 
characteristics in question compared to Non-networked firms. The inverse is equally true. All t-statistics are significant 
at the 1% level of significance. T-statistics are computed assuming non-equality of means between networked and non-
networked firms.  
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FYROM (Macedonia)  2.7 2.0 -3.3 
Serbia and Montenegro  2.7 1.0  0.0 
Albania  2.7 2.0 -7.1 
Croatia 4.0  2.3  0.3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2.7 1.0 -9.9 
Slovenia  3.3 2.7  8.5 
Poland  3.7 3.3  7.0 
Hungary  4.0 3.3  8.7 
Czech rep  4.0 3.0  6.8 
Slovak rep  3.7  3.3  2.8 
Romania 3.0  2.3  -0.8 
Bulgaria  3.7 2.7  0.1 
Latvia  3.7 3.0  2.6 
Lithuania  3.7 3.3  2.6 
Estonia  4.0 3.3  6.1 
The Distribution of institutional quality across sample countries. The EBRD bank reform and EBRD 
competition policy indices are both obtained from the EBRD structural Indicators Database 2009. The 
values of both indices range between 0 (minimum) and 4+ (maximum). Higher values depict countries at 
higher levels of bank reform and a more competitive climate, respectively. Institutional quality index is 
obtained from Bacchetta and Drabek (2002). The index ranges from -25 to 25, with higher values depicting 
countries at higher levels of institutional quality. 
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Table 7: Model Specifications 
 
Model specifications for firm financing for new investment, and Firm’s bank choice. The choice of 
variables employed by both models, differ to the extent that one variable is excluded in either model 
specification. EBRD Competition policy index is excluded from firm’s bank choice regression, while 
EBRD bank reform index is excluded from Firm financing for new investment regression. 





Small and Medium 
Enterprises     
   Young firms     
  
Small and Medium 
Enterprises* Young 
firms 
   
  Growth of Fixed Assets     
Firm ownership  State-owned firms     
   Foreign-owned firms     
   Private Domestic firms     
Business sector 
Manufacturing sector 




Firms membership of 
business association 
   
Research And 
Development 
Prior Year Research and 
Development Spending 




Policy index     
  
Institutional Quality 
Index     
  
EBRD Bank Reform 




Table 8. Probit marginal effects estimates of a firm’s affiliation to business 
association 
Explanatory Variables  Probit Marginal 
Effects 
(Standard Errors) 
State Firm  -0.0521 
(0.0640) 
Foreign Firm  0.151*** 
(0.0641) 
Domestic Private  Firm  -0.0228 
(0.0505) 
Small and Medium Enterprises  -0.300*** 
(0.0367) 
Young Firm  -0.129*** 
(0.0222) 
Exporting firm  0.142*** 
(0.0239) 
Balkan country  0.355*** 
(0.0224) 
Log-likelihood -1426.83 
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (7)  422.15*** 
Number of Observations  2365 
The table reports First stage probit (marginal effects) regression estimates with firm-level data using 2005 
BEEPS. The dependent variable is a firm’s affiliation to a Business Association, which we interprete as a 
firms Networking status. All variables employed in the regression are dummy variables, and detailed 
descriptions are as provided in appendix. The Number of observations is 2365 is arrived at, after excluding 
all firms missing observations for atleast one of the variables included in our model specification.  Standard 
errors are provided in parenthesis. *= significant at 10%,; ** = significant at 5%;  *** = significant at 1%. 
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Table 9. Probit marginal effects of likelihood of firm financing opportunities  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




Non-bank finance  Equity  
finance 
Predicted Business Association  -0.192***  0.203***  0.0835*  .0000509 
 (0.066)  (0.0556)  (0.0501)  (0.0282) 
State Firm  0.0111  -0.137***  -0.000803  -0.0283* 
 (0.0626)  (0.0375)  (0.0487)  (0.0175) 
Foreign Firm  0.163***  -0.144***  -0.0267  -0.0179 
 (0.0622)  (0.0385)  (0.0490)  (0.0226) 
Domestic Private Firm  0.0157  0.00312  -0.00438  -0.0106 
 (0.0483)  (0.0403)  (0.0376)  (0.0230) 
Growth  of  fixed  assets  -0.00112*** 0.00116***  0.000516** -0.0000248 
 (0.0003)  (0.00024)  (0.00022)  (0.00014) 
Prior Year Research & 
Development spending  -0.0000192 0.0000672  7.90e-06  0.0000262 
 (0.00006)  (0.00005)  (0.00004)  (0.00002) 
Small and Medium Enterprise  -0.0850  0.0885*  0.0324  -0.0155 
 (0.0727)  (0.0503)  (0.0502)  (0.0376) 
Young Firm  -0.133  -0.0330  0.00682  0.0196 
 (0.107)  (0.0928)  (0.0786)  (0.0434) 
Small and Medium Enterprise X 
Young firm  0.0422 0.0655  0.0333  0.00234 
 (0.108)  (0.0963)  (0.0807)  (0.0408) 
Competition policy  -0.0715** 0.0247  0.0240  0.0253 
 (0.0315)  (0.0269)  (0.0261)  (0.0183) 
Institutional Quality  0.0030886 -0.0080101** -0.00654** 0.00325 
 (0.00418)  (0.00365)  (0.00338)  (0.00201) 
Business Association X 
Institutional quality  -0.00988*** 0.0100***  0.00757***  0.00154 
  (0.00368) (0.00319)  (0.0028) (0.00147) 
Balkan country  0.228***  -0.194***  -0.223***  -0.0431 
 (0.0779)  (0.0518)  (0.0380)  (0.0334) 
Business Association* Balkan 
country  -0.0818* 0.148***  0.138**  0.0533 
 (0.0520)  (0.0540)  (0.0662)  (0.0635) 
        
Log likelihood  -1605.82  -1281.26  -1120.97  -528.81 
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (14)  66.92***  127.11***  62.66***  60.03*** 
Number of Observations  2365  2365  2365  2365 
The table reports probit (marginal effects) regression estimates for firm financing for new fixed investment using 2005 BEEPS data. All firms 
with missing observations for any variable are omitted from this analysis. The dependent variables in all regressions are whether the firm 
finances any proportion of new fixed investment using: 1 =100% Internal funds, 2 = Any bank finance,  3 = Any Non-bank finance (i.e, sum of 
trade credit from suppliers, trade credit from customers, Credit cards, and leasing arrangements), 4 = Any equity finance. The variable, 
predicted Business Association, is the predicted value of business association obtained from running the probit regression in table 8 above, and 
employed as a regressor in the present regression. All other variable definitions are as detailed in the appendix. Standard errors are shown in 




Table 10. Probit Marginal Effects Estimates of firms’ access to banks by ownership type
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable  State bank  Domestic private 
Commercial Bank 
Foreign bank 
Predicted Business Association   0.000354  0.170***  0.0603* 
 (0.0029)  (0.0493)  (0.0165) 
State Firm  -0.0253**  -0.0825**  -0.0168** 
 (0.0113)  (0.0363)  (0.00687) 
Foreign Firm  -0.0199  -0.111***  -0.00498 
 (0.0145)  (0.0322)  (0.0135) 
Domestic Private Firm  -0.00358  0.0124  0.000829 
 (0.0176)  (0.0353)  (0.0111) 
Prior year Growth of fixed assets  0.0000296  0.000914***  0.000141** 
 (0.0001)  (0.00021)  (0.00006) 
Prior Year Research and Development 
spending 
7.80e-06 0.0000672*  0.0000147* 
 (0.00002)  (0.0004)  (0.00001) 
Small and Medium Enterprise  0.00211  0.0693*  0.00756 
 (0.0249)  (0.0425)  (0.0131) 
Young Firm  0.0518  -0.170*  0.0336 
 (0.0382)  (0.0908)  (0.0271) 
Small and Medium Enterprise X Young 
firm 
-0.0448* .2286439  -0.0217 
 (0.0257)  (0.115)**  (0.0175) 
EBRD Bank Reform Index  -0.0309**  0.0704***  0.0101 
 (0.0147)  (0.0263)  (0.00782) 
Institutional Quality  0.00447***  -0.0117***  -0.00169 
 (0.00157)  (0.0033)  (0.00114) 
Business Association X Institutional 
quality 
0.00276** 0.00949***  -0.00145 
 (0.00121)  (0.00288)  (0.0011) 
Balkan country  -0.0362*  0.00949***  -0.0200 
 (0.0225)  (0.0428)  (0.0131) 
Business Association X Balkan country  0.0649  0.0667  0.0264 
 (0.0596)  (0.0464)  (0.0234) 
      
Log likelihood  -396.68  -1109.02  -280.66 
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (14)  53.65***  98.09***  76.36*** 
Number of Observations  2365  2365  2365 
The table reports probit (marginal effects) regression estimates for firm’s bank choice for new fixed investment using 
2005 BEEPS data. All firms with missing observations for any variable are omitted from this analysis. The dependent 
variables in all regressions are whether the firm finances any proportion of new fixed investment using Bank finance 
from 1 = State Bank; 2 = Domestic private commercial Banks; 3 = Foreign Bank. The variable, predicted Business 
Association, is the predicted value of business association obtained from running the probit regression in table 8 
above, and employed as a regressor in the present regression. All other variable definitions are as detailed in the 
appendix. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *= significant at 10%,; ** = significant at 5%;  *** = significant 
at 1%.  
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Table 11. Fixed effects Logit marginal effects of firms financing opportunities  
  










Business Association  -0.287  0.859***  -2.295***  -0.847 
 (0.238)  (0.289)  (0.287)  (0.855) 
Growth of fixed assets  0.00296  -0.00463  0.00532*  -0.00248 
 (0.00283)  (0.0.00374)  (0.00302)  (0.00596) 
Institutional Quality  0.143 -0.172  -0.611***  -0.5032 




0.0591 -0.0584 0.0797*  0.0259 
 (0.0407)  (0.0487)  (0.0483)  (0.150) 
Log likelihood  -100.96  -74.75  -142.85  -18.44 
LR chi2(4)  4.63**  12.69***  145.43***  4.71** 
Number of Observations  298  234  622  60 
Number of Firms  149  117  311  30 
The table reports fixed effects logit (Marginal effects) regression estimates with firm-level fixed effects using the panel 
component of the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS. Our panel is a balanced panel of 780 firms, however as multiple outcomes 
within groups of firms were encountered such affected firms were dropped from regression estimates across the various 
firm finance choices. Variables included in the regression are variables from table 9 which have the potential to vary 
over time. All dependent variables are also as defined in table 9 above. Consistent with our probit regression results in 
table 9 above, networked firms are more likely to obtain bank finance. In addition, the insignificance of the interaction 
of Business Association and Institutional Quality suggests that, in countries with poor institutional quality, firms 
network membership aids their access to bank finance. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *= significant at 10%,; 
** = significant at 5%;  *** = significant at 1%.  
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Table 12.  Fixed effects Logit marginal effects of firms’ access to bank loans  
  Firms borrowing from 
VARIABLES  State Bank  Local Private 
Commercial Bank 
Foreign bank  
      
Business Association  -0.611  0.754***  1.336*** 
 (0.713)  (0.314)  (0.667) 
Growth of fixed assets  -0.0126  -0.00562  0.0181* 
 (0.0159)  (0.00376)  (0.0104) 
Institutional Quality 0.0399  0.0632  Na[1] 
 (0.440)  (0.320)   
Business Association*Institutional 
Quality 
0.0945 -0.0608  -0.0766 
 (0.109)  (0.0550)  (0.110) 
      
Log likelihood  -27.34  -62.73  -12.36 
LRchi2(4) 2.16  10.39**  9.93*** 
Number of Observations  82  196  50 
Number of Firms  41  98  25 
[1] Note that the institutional quality variable is dropped for foreign banks. 
The table reports Logit (Marginal effects) regression estimates for firm’s bank choice, with firm-level fixed effects using 
the panel component of the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS.  Our panel is a balanced panel of 780 firms, however as multiple 
outcomes within groups of firms were encountered such affected firms were dropped from regression estimates across 
the various firm bank choices. Variables included in the regression are variables from table 10 which have the potential 
to vary over time. With regards to foreign bank choice, the variable institutional quality was dropped from the regression 
on account of institutional quality having no within group variance. All dependent variables are as defined also in table 
10 above. Consistent with our probit regression results in table 10 above, networked firms are more likely to obtain bank 
finance from local private commercial banks. In addition, the insignificance of the interaction of Business Association 
and Institutional Quality suggests that, in countries with poor institutional quality, firms network membership aids their 
access to bank finance. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *= significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = 




Appendix. Table A1: List of variables and summary statistics 
Variable Names  Variable definitions Mean  Standard 
Deviation
100% Internal Finance  This refers to firms that finance their new fixed investment 
entirely by internal funds.  It is a dummy variable taking the 
value of “1” if firms finance their new fixed investment 
entirely by internal finance, and “0” otherwise.
0.50 0.50 
Bank finance  This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from the bank. It is a dummy variable 
taking the value of “1” if any proportion of financing for 
new fixed investment is obtained from the bank and “0” 
otherwise. 
0.26 0.43 
Non-Bank finance  This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from non-bank sources – Trade credit 
from Suppliers, trade credit from customers, credit cards, 
leasing arrangements. It is a dummy variable taking the 
value of “1” if any proportion of financing for new fixed 
investment is obtained from non-bank sources and “0” 
otherwise. 
0.19 0.39 
Equity finance  This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from equity. It is a dummy variable 
taking the value of “1” if any proportion of financing for 
new fixed investment is obtained from equity, and “0” 
otherwise.  
0.06 0.24 
State Banks  This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from state banks. It is a dummy 
variable taking the value of “1” if the firm borrows from a 




This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from Domestic private commercial 
banks. It is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the 
bank borrows from a domestic private commercial bank 
and “0” otherwise.
0.19 0.39 
Foreign Banks  This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from foreign banks. It is a dummy 
variable taking the value of “1” if the bank borrows from a 
Foreign bank and “0” otherwise.
0.03 0.17 
State firm   This refers to a State-owned firm. It is a dummy variable 
taking the value of  “1” if the Government is the majority 
owner of the firm and  “0” otherwise
0.07 0.25 
Foreign firm   This refers to a foreign-owned firm. It is a dummy variable 
taking the value of “1”, if a foreign company is the majority 
owner of the firm, and “0” otherwise.
0.06 0.24 
Domestic Private firm   This refers to a firm owned by a local citizen or company. 
It comprises the sum of the dummy variables of Individual 
firm ownership, Family firm ownership, domestic company 
ownership and general public firm ownership. It is thus a 
dummy variable, with “!” indicating that a local citizen or 
company is the majority owner of the firm and “0” 
otherwise. 




Small and Medium 
Enterprise 
This refers to firms of Small and medium size. A small and 
Medium enterprise is defined according to the BEEPS 
survey data, as a company having a labour force size of  
between zero and 249 workers.  The variable denoting a 
SME is a dummy. This is coded “1” for small or medium 
sized firm (enterprise)  and “0” otherwise.
0.91 0.28 
Young Firm  This refers to a firms years of existence or operation. We 
define a young firm as one in existence as at 1995. Our 
definition of a young firm follows that by Klapper et al 
(2002).  A young firm is so coded as a dummy variable, 
taking the value of “1” if a firm is a young firm, and “0” 
otherwise.  
0.41 0.49 
Small and Medium 
Enterprise X Young firm 
An interaction term derived from the product of the 




Business association membership. A dummy variable 
coded “0” for firms not having business association 
membership and “1” for firms. Possessing business 
association membership.
0.48 0.50 
Exporting Firm  This refers to a firm that exports goods either directly or 
indirectly. It is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if 
a firm exports goods and “0” otherwise.
0.32 0.47 
Growth of fixed assets.  This is the growth of a firm’s investment in fixed assets. It 
is expressed in percentage 
16.96 33.96 
Prior year research and 
development spending 
Research and Development spending in the previous year. 
This is a continuous variable measuring the amount of 
Research and development spending by firms (in thousands 
of US dollars). 
31.91 192.26 
Competition policy index  An EBRD Country business competition policy index 
ranging from 0.0 to 4.0 with higher values depicting 
countries with more (stringent) competitive climates, and 
low values depicting countries with less competitive 
climates. 
2.80 0.63 
Institutional Quality  A country broad composite index of institutional quality, 
comprising five component indicators – Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory burden, Rule of law, graft, and 
extent of democracy (voice and accountability) .(see 
Bacchetta and Drabek (2002),  . Values range from values 
of -25.00 to 25.00 with higher values depicting higher 
quality institutions and low values depicting low quality 
institutions. 
3.63 4.60 
Bank Reform Index  An EBRD index indicating the extent to which banking 
sector reforms have taken place in transition countries. It 
ranges from 0.0 to 4.0, with higher values depicting that the 
countries are at an advanced stage of banking sector reform. 
3.56 0.45 
Balkan  This represents a country from the Balkan region 
comprising: Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR of Macedonia. 
It is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if a firm is 
located in a Balkan country and “0” otherwise. 




Business Association  X 
Balkan country 
An interaction term derived from the product of the 
variables, Business Association and Balkan.
0.18 0.38 
Business Association X 
institution Quality 
An interaction term derived from the product of the 
variables, Business Association and Institution Quality.
1.40 3.82 





Table A2: Descriptive statistics for the panel data analysis  
 
Variable Names  Mean  Standard 
Deviation
100% Internal Finance  0.49 0.50 
Bank finance  0.27 0.44 
Non-Bank finance  0.60 0.49 
Equity finance  0.05 0.22 
State Banks  0.053 0.22 
Domestic  Private Commercial Banks  0.19 0.39 
Foreign Banks  0.037 0.19 
Business Association  0.38 0.48 
Growth of Fixed assets  22.70 44.44 
Institutional Quality  2.13 4.95 
Business Association*Institutional Quality  0.69 3.37 
Source: 2002 and 2005 BEEPS data and EBRD institutional indices 
 